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Richard Stith

Construction vs. Development: Polarizing
Models of Human Gestation

ABSTRACT. This essay argues that the polarization of our public debate over
embryo-destructive research may be due, to a large extent, not to different valuations of individual human life but to different conceptions of the process of
gestation, with one group treating the process as a making or construction and the
other treating it as a development. These two incompatible models of reproduction
are shown to explain the various positions commonly encountered in this debate
over the treatment of embryos, and to a significant degree those encountered in
the debate over abortion as well. Finally, the historical, theoretical, and intuitive
strengths of each model are examined.1

I

f we distance ourselves from the content of the debate for and against
the destruction of human embryos for scientific research purposes, we
may be struck by its rhetorical form. Each side thinks not only that it
has the superior argument, but that its conclusion is wholly obvious, while
the other side’s position is obviously mistaken. Those who defend splitting
embryos to obtain stem cells (let us call them the “defenders”) say that it
is ridiculous to claim that a tiny zygote or blastocyst without a brain is
the same sort of being as we, while those who oppose this research (let
us call them the “opponents”) claim it to be clear as day that each of us
is the same being we were when newly conceived, though now grown up.
The resultant political and social polarization is not only unfortunate
but hard to comprehend. Why should understanding be so difficult here?
After all, extreme incomprehension is not normal. As a matter of debating
tactics we may call another’s claims “absurd,” but we can usually see that
a bit of reasoning has in fact been done, though not well. We can see the
point of view of the other, that it could make sense to someone who had
not tried hard enough to think the matter through. How then can each
of the two sides in the embryo debate (sincerely, let us presume) think it
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal Vol. 24, No. 4, 345–384 © 2014 by The Johns Hopkins University Press
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itself makes perfect sense while the other speaks virtual nonsense? This is
the perplexity that originally inspired this essay.
It cannot be simply that each side starts from a different value premise.
We are quite accustomed to understanding such differences. Those who eat
meat can easily see that it makes sense to be a vegetarian if one considers
all animal life sacred. Moreover, for the most part, there appear to be no
great value differences between the two sides to the embryo debate. Few
on either side would deny that the life of every individual human being
should be respected by society and by science. The problem is that one
side considers this principle obviously irrelevant while the other considers
it obviously decisive. Why such vastly different conclusions given a shared
value premise?
Nor can it be that one side simply finds the dignity of early life to be
outweighed by the prospective benefits of using embryonic stem cells, while
the other sees the scale to be tipping the other way. If the disagreement were
only over how best to balance these or any other mutually acknowledged
goods, the debate would be far less polarized. Each side would see how the
other position would make some sense, even though the precise outcome of
the balancing would still be in dispute. This, in fact, is the normal situation
in our public debates. Why is the embryo-research debate so different?
The solution to this puzzle proposed here is that each side may begin by
assuming not a value but a process, in one case a process of construction
and in the other a process of development. Because these starting points
are believed by their partisans to be both factual and obvious, each side
fails even to imagine that the other might not begin at the same point. Thus
their supreme self-confidence. Put concretely: each side appears to take
absolutely for granted a model of human gestation that renders inevitable
its own conclusion and impossible that of the other.
This clarification of tacit background assumptions would be worthwhile
even if there were in the end no way for reason to judge between them,
as could be the case, for example, if one or both rested on some religious
revelation. Simply understanding one another, overcoming the sense that
the other is inexplicably perverse, furthers the great good of mutual respect.
Having found a way to resolve one puzzle, we turn to another: how
two such contradictory models manage to survive together in the modern
world. Various inadequate explanations will be considered before turning
to a simple intuitive answer. We will see that when we look forward to the
future, the construction model makes more intuitive sense, while when we
look backward to the past, the development model makes more intuitive
[ 346 ]
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sense. Thus each model has found a psychic niche in which to survive.
Before beginning, however, certain statements of modesty are in order.
This essay argues only that if each side of the embryo debate adhered
to one of these two models, much or all of the content of their positions
would be well explained. The likely empirical existence of these two mental
models of gestation is indeed suggested by this predictive power, as well
as by a number of quotations, and in this article the models will often
be assumed to be present in the minds of debate participants. But, in the
absence of difficult and detailed survey results, the essay does not claim
to prove that all or most of those engaging in the debates are consciously
or unconsciously using these precise models; some other models, similar
but not identical to those elaborated in this essay, could be operative, for
example.
Moreover, let it be emphasized that the essay is concerned only with
finding a way to understand deep disagreement about human identity
(across time and change) among persons who share the widespread premise
that each human being possesses a real and intrinsic dignity. (Many but
not all such persons also hold that intentionally destroying an innocent
human being is virtually always wrong.) The essay is not as relevant for
those who do not find a dignity simply in being human. Its arguments
might not matter much to a philosopher who considered only experience
rather than being to have worth. Such a person need not find killing human
beings per se problematic, or even care to know the kind of being that
is being sacrificed. For example, a single-minded utilitarian—someone
whose only moral goals were to maximize pleasurable experiences and
minimize painful ones—would not see any normative difference between
such experiences in humans and similar experiences in other animals, nor
would the utilitarian see something intrinsically wrong with killing any
of us, as long as it could be done without pain to the one killed and to
others impacted by the killing.
It should be clear, therefore, that this essay does not pretend fully
to analyze the complex political debates concerning whether embryodestructive research should be permitted and subsidized. Still less does
it aim to resolve all disagreement about abortion. Arguments from the
abortion debates will sometimes be used to clarify the two models of
gestation, but neither model of gestation can by itself dictate a position
on abortion.2
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I. THE CONSTRUCTION MODEL

In December of 2005 an op-ed piece by sociology professor Dalton
Conley appeared in The New York Times, suggesting that “most Americans
. . . see a fetus as an individual under construction.” Conley, of course,
could not have meant “construction” in its most immediate, literal sense.
He certainly did not imagine scaffolding and ladders in the womb. Probably
he meant only that most Americans consider the fetus to be an individual
“in the making.” But construction is more descriptive than the generic
notion of making, containing the idea not only that materials are added—
or sometimes subtracted—as happens in most sorts of making, but also
that the result has the integrity of a structure. And we construct not only
buildings but systems, mechanisms, sentences, concepts, and much more.
So let us stick with Conley’s word “construction” as the primary name for
the first of the two models, while bearing in mind that other “making”
words could be used to name this way of thinking.
Now just think of something being constructed (or fabricated, gathered
together, mixed, created, formed, sculpted—or in any other way made),
such as a manuscript being composed on sheets of paper. Or, to begin with
an example a bit more analogous to gestation, take a house being built
or a car on an assembly line. When is the house or the car first there? At
what point in the process of its assembly would we first say, “There’s a
car?” Some of us could be drawn to appearance, saying that there is a car
as soon as the body is fairly complete (analogy: the fetus at three months
or so, when it looks rather like a miniature baby). Others could perhaps
look for some activating power, saying that there is a car only after a motor
is put in place (think of the old belief that the fetus “quickens” with the
insertion of an animating soul in mid-pregnancy). Others might wait until
it were ready to roll or were even on the street (in analogy to viability
or birth, although in reality a newborn human is not viable on its own).
And there could be many other differing opinions here—as there would
be if we were to elaborate upon the question of when a house comes to
be (roof vs. walls vs. furnace. . .).
However, despite our differences concerning exactly when a car first
exists in an assembly line, there are two points on which many or all of
us would agree.
First of all, we would tend to agree that there is no one correct answer.
All responses depend both upon the concept of a car that happens to be
held by each person and upon how insistent each person happens to be
that the object on the assembly line approximate his or her concept before
[ 348 ]
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getting labeled “car.” Even if by chance there were great agreement (say
two-thirds voted for appearance as the crucial element), this consensus
would seem to indicate only a unity of subjective imagination, not one of
objective judgment (and therefore arguably not one that should preempt
other views). Note that like features (plurality and subjectivity) characterize
the conventional wisdom that holds sway with regard to the point the
embryo or fetus merits the label “human being,” making abortion seem a
matter best left largely to personal choice. The construction model makes
perfect sense of this ruling consensus.
Something upon which all are likely to agree: the car takes a while to
appear on the assembly line. It is not immediately there at the beginning.
Nobody is going to say that a car is present when the first screw or rivet
is put in or when two pieces of metal are first welded together. (You can
see how little I know about car manufacturing.) Two pieces of metal
fastened together do not match up to anyone’s idea of a car. Someone who
affirmed the contrary—that a car is suddenly present at the point where
it first begins to be constructed—would not be taken seriously.
If Professor Conley is right that most Americans believe the fetus to
be an individual under construction, most of us will attribute the same
nonsensicality to someone we hear opposing the intentional destruction
of human embryos on the ground that this destruction is a violation of the
basic human right to life. Listen to journalist Michael Kinsley, writing in
the Washington Post in favor of embryonic stem cell research, express his
utter bewilderment at this opposition: “I cannot share, or even fathom,
[the anti-research] conviction that a microscopic dot—as oblivious as a
rock, more primitive than a worm—has the same rights as anyone reading
this article. . . . Moral sincerity is not impressive if it depends on willful
ignorance and indifference to logic” (2006).3
There is a deep truth at the base of Kinsley’s incomprehension. Nothing
can be a particular thing until it has the essential form or nature of that
particular sort of thing. And certainly the essentials of something under
construction are not yet present at the beginning of the construction
process. In the first stages of construction, one has not yet built a house or
a car or a human individual. One never has what one is making when one
has just started making it. The basic form of a thing under construction
“just plain isn’t there” at the beginning of the construction process. It is
not there because that form is being gradually imposed from the outside
by the persons or forces doing the construction (the accumulating, the
building, the assembling, the chemical mixing, the sculpting, the sewing—
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or whatever other kind of making), and at the beginning they have not yet
been able to shape the raw material into what it will eventually be. Only
as it approaches completeness—as it acquires what some people think are
the essentials of a “house,” a “car,” or a “human”—will it be begin to
be given those labels: a point rather vague and variable, as we have seen.
The key to this concept of construction is the gradual imposition of
form. For cars and houses, one begins with little or nothing and adds
piece after piece.4 But making may also begin with unformed matter, as
in sculpting, which is then shaped through pressure or subtraction. A
constructionist could argue that just as a raw piece of wood should be given
little “credit” for its potential beauty until that potential has been realized
by a sculptor, so, too, an embryo does not deserve much “credit” for its
potential humanity when it still resembles a rock or a worm (as Hinsley
pointed out). Constructionists may thus admit that a human “potential” is
there from the beginning, but assert that the embryo or fetus is not actually
human until it has been shaped into recognizable humanity.5
The construction model was in fact a major, if not the dominant,
understanding of early gestation during antiquity and the Middle Ages.6
Thus for example, although he never favored abortion, Thomas Aquinas
was partly a constructionist who did not consider early abortion to be
killing in the same sense as murder. Basing his theory on Aristotle, he
surmised that the male semen was used as an instrument by the paternal
soul (“soul” for the Greek philosopher being a biological hypothesis, not
a religious supposition) within the womb, where it was the active agent
that fabricated an inert embryo out of passive maternal blood (the spermentering-ovum idea of conception being unimagined until much later).
Only after its father’s soul had constructed an adequately human form
could the fetus have its own, fully-human soul infused into it (Aquinas,
Ia, Q.118, art. 1 ad 3–4, art. 2 ad 2). From that point forward, the fetal
soul (like the soul of every living creature, plant or animal, according
to Aquinas and Aristotle) directed further growth and preservation as
a whole and healthy human organism. In other words, Aquinas taught
that the infusion of an animating or rational soul was the last act in the
constructionist phase of human pregnancy, the last act of making, the last
joining together by a force outside the fetus. Thenceforth the fetus would
be on its own, eventually manifesting its rational soul in speech and action.
Though Aquinas does not appear to have relied on revelation for his
early-pregnancy constructionism, Biblical descriptions of prenatal life are
likewise predominantly constructionist. However, they depict God rather
[ 350 ]
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than the father’s soul as the creator (constructor) of the fetus. Thus Job
exclaims, “Did you not pour me out like milk and curdle me like cheese?
You clothed me with skin and flesh, and knit me together with bones and
sinews” (Job 10:10–11; New Revised Standard Version).7 Here the paternal
semen (which transmits the active agent-soul according to the teaching of
Aquinas) seems to be the passive material that God as active agent first
uses for the construction of the intrauterine human body.8
The presence of a construction model of gestation is especially helpful
in explaining the views of those who support embryo-destructive research
but oppose abortion after the first weeks or months of pregnancy. For
example, those constructionists who think a heartbeat to be the essential
sign of life may approve of blastocyst-destructive research but still think
abortion wrong after the first few weeks of pregnancy, after the heart starts
beating, while those who look for the presence of human features, such
as hands or feet, may well be tolerant of abortion for nearly three months
but oppose it thereafter. Both groups may believe strongly in individual
human dignity and even inviolability, but simply not yet recognize the
presence of a living human being before the essentials of human life are
present (whatever each considers those essentials to be). They may also
believe their notions of what count as life’s essentials to be fundamentally
subjective (i.e. only in their minds rather than in the stuff of nature itself)
and so be somewhat reluctant to impose their personal views on others.
Somewhere around three months, however, the model of construction,
or of any form of making, becomes rapidly more difficult to apply to
the process of human gestation. At about the end of the first trimester
of pregnancy, the fetus is easily envisioned by lay persons as well as
scientists to be a complete, though tiny, human being both externally in its
features (e.g. hands, feet, and face) and internally in its organs.9 Though
these will still be quite rudimentary, it is growth and maturation that are
needed now, rather than further construction. In other words, because we
know of no kind of making that resembles the growth and maturation
of a substantially unchanging form, the construction model loses much
of its power at this point. Unlike the assembling of a car (which is from
beginning to end a process of addition) or the cutting away of wood for a
sculpture (a process of subtraction), by three months or so human gestation
would seem in fact—not just in our minds—to employ some process other
than making (much as Aristotle and Aquinas taught) as the fetus moves
on toward viability and birth. Possibly reflecting a consensus that that
a tiny human being has now been formed, most Western nations that
[ 351 ]
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have chosen to legalize elective abortion have imposed a limit of around
three months (Levine 2004, 135–37) and American approval of abortion
sharply declines after this first trimester.10 (There are nations and persons
that defend virtually elective abortion later in pregnancy,11 but they may
be doing so for reasons other than doubt about the existence of an actual
human life in mid- and late pregnancy.)
The construction model helps explain yet another set of opinions,
ones otherwise quite puzzling, about abortion and especially about the
use of embryos for research. In suggesting that the embryo is “under
construction,” Professor Conley did not intend to deprive it of all value.
Here is a fuller statement of his view: “[M]ost Americans . . . do not think
that a fetus is the same as a person, but neither do they think of it as part
and parcel of a woman’s body like her appendix, her kidney, or a tumor.
They see a fetus as an individual under construction” (2005).
In other words, even in constructionist thought, the incomplete embryo
or fetus can have a certain value, namely, as a work in progress. Abortion
may not be murder because a human individual has not yet been fully
fabricated, but it is not good to destroy anything well on the way to being
something that we really care about (as most of us say we do about every
human individual). If the entity on the assembly line were a Corvette-To-Be
and if we really loved Corvettes, we would feel bad about destroying it even
part-way through the construction process. Or we might value a work in
progress not for what it is becoming but for its authorship. Suppose (before
the days of computers) a colleague had just begun composing an article
and I took a page of his manuscript to use the back side for a shopping
list. It might be true that no one would have called it an “article” yet,
but I still did something wrong (in addition to theft) because I showed
disrespect to its author. Similarly, abortion might be rejected not because
it is murder but rather because God or one’s spouse were thought to be
the author or co-author of the new life being made in the womb. Workin-progress thinking may explain much of the feelings of those who say
that there is something wrong with early abortion but that it is not as bad
as killing a child already born.12
The valuing-a-work-in-progress facet of the constructionist model can
also help explain one of the most perplexing positions to be found in
the life debates. Some politicians wish to protect intrauterine life from
abortion starting at the moment of conception, but at the same time
support laboratory research lethal to human embryos that have remained
unused after in vitro fertilization treatments. Similarly, the Irish Supreme
[ 352 ]
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Court construed the clear constitutional “right to life of the unborn” not to
carry over from protection against intrauterine abortion to like protection
outside the womb (Roche v. Roche & ors [2009] IESC 82 (Ir.))13 These
differing stances toward newly-conceived life seem contradictory until
examined under a constructionist lens.
The peculiar intermediate sort of value of a work-in-progress, e.g.,
of a Corvette-To-Be, comes from the fact that it is being assembled or
composed or sculpted into something that we care about. In its early
stages, it does not have virtually any form or value of its own (does not
yet amount to much of anything) but gets its definition and meaning from
the form still in the mind of its maker. Thus, if my colleague decides early
on not to complete that article and tosses his work into the trash, of what
value are the sheets of paper upon which he has written? They become
just scrap paper; we can freely turn them over and use the back of the
sheets for grocery lists, or fold them into paper airplanes. If the factory
making the Corvette-To-Be shuts down, those two pieces of metal left at
the beginning of the assembly line likewise become scrap. You can use
them for whatever you want, for the simple reason that they are not a
Corvette-To-Be any more. (“Scrap” is probably too strong a word. An old
piece of construction from an admired colleague or car could well retain a
kind of symbolic or souvenir value.) An embryo conceived in vitro outside
the womb and never chosen to be implanted is even worse off. It gains
little or no work-in-progress value to begin with, because it was never a
“construction project” in anyone’s womb, and work-in-progress value is
the only value very early life can ever have for those who agree with the
construction model of gestation.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT MODEL

We have seen how (from the perspective of the construction model) the
destruction of embryos, especially those outside the womb, can appear
quite reasonable, while the recognition of an embryonic right to life
seems absurd. Thus we have completed half of the first task set before
us at the beginning of this essay: we have shown how the defenders of
embryonic stem cell research can find their opponents to lack all sense.
To complete an explanation of the polarization of the stem-cell research
debate, however, we must also show how the opponents of the research
can find their stance fully rational and that of its defenders quite irrational.
To that task we now turn.
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Let us consider an entity that we think develops (rather than one we
think constructed). A plant may be a useful starting point, so that we
may clearly grasp the idea of development before applying it directly
to the subject of controversy, i.e., to the sort of life that passes through
embryonic and fetal stages.
Take a blue spruce. At what stage of its development would we say that
a young plant becomes a blue spruce, that a blue spruce actually exists?
At the very first moment it germinates and begins to develop within the
seed? (In analogy to human conception or fertilization.) When it sprouts
and begins to carry water and nutrients inward from its environment?
(In strained analogy to a fetus with a heart just beginning to beat.) When
it starts to look like a small tree? (In analogy to a fetus at around three
months.) When it ceases to need constant care or is ready to be replanted?
(Possible analogy to viability or birth.) Or perhaps when it finally achieves
sufficient maturity to live up to the name “conifer” and bear cones?
(Analogy to human puberty.)
The most appropriate response here is that these are all bad questions,
ones that cover up rather than reveal our real perceptions and thoughts.
The growing plant never becomes a blue spruce because it always is a
blue spruce, from the first moment of its active development, i.e., from
germination.14 The plant develops, to be sure, from a sprout into a tree,
but those are just stages of the same kind of plant—indeed, of the same
individual living organism. It never was nor could be any type of being
other than a blue spruce. If we ask at the nursery what those little sprouts
are, the answer might well be “Those are blue spruces, but they’ve got a
ways to go before they’re ready to be replanted.”
This is the development model. Note that the blue spruce participates in
changing itself.15 Unlike something being constructed, it does not need to
wait to receive from outside itself the form that defines its nature, the form
that will make it a certain kind of thing. That form, nature, or “design”
(a word used here without any implication of a “designer,” natural or
supernatural) is within it from the beginning, guiding its progress toward
maturity.16 Identified by that nature throughout its development, quite
independently of its appearance or functioning, it is always the same
kind of thing. And because it does not need to approximate completion
before becoming what it always has been, labeling it that type of thing
is not uncertain and subjective in the way that labeling something under
construction a “house” or a “car” is inherently inexact and personal.17
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In brief: a living organism defines itself independently of our definitions.18
The meaning of development may be further clarified by comparing
and contrasting it with the sort of making called sculpting. Sculpting, as
we saw above, begins with a potential; the unsculpted block of wood may
be said to contain the “potential” for a statue. Likewise, the undeveloped
embryo contains the “potential” for an adult. However, the potential found
in the wood is wholly passive. Unlike a developing organism, the block
of wood has nothing within itself to reveal. Ready to be chiseled from
the outside rather than to develop itself, its future design lies within the
subjective vision of the one doing the sculpting; the objective presence of
that design is still wholly missing from physical reality. The humanity of
the embryo, however, is always objectively present and active: the embryo
is stamped from conception with the design of a human being, and that
design is not just some sort of passive blueprint. It is a directing power
gradually revealing its nature. Though (like the block) the embryo can
linguistically be said to have a hidden potential, its active inner design
already gives the embryo a species identity and an individual identity,
while the passive potential of the wood does not in any way identify it as
a sculpture, much less as a particular individual sculpture. Put another
way, it is quite possible scientifically fully to describe the piece of wood
without ever mentioning its sculptural potential, but an embryo cannot
be fully described (certainly not as “rocklike” or “wormlike”) without
disclosing its active inner potency, perhaps someday including (as we learn
more) its particular individual character (race, deep sexual tendencies, and
more). To call its future merely “potential” is thus misleading at best,19
in that the word can refer ambivalently either to a passive potential or to
an active potential.20
Human artifice can, however, introduce construction even into life. A
quick glance at how this can happen (in a way unrelated to embryos) will
be useful to clarify further the meaning of development.
Consider the type of construction called grafting. Let us suppose that
what originally spouts from the ground and grows into a small tree
is not a blue spruce but some sort of ordinary green spruce. Suppose
further that the top of the green spruce is then cut off and the top of a
blue spruce grafted upon it. (This might be done because the roots of the
green spruce are hardier but the needles of the blue spruce are considered
more beautiful.) After this grafted organism matures, it will be no doubt
sold as a blue spruce, but the nursery owner will have to admit, if asked,
that it started out as a green spruce (or, if you will, that it started out as
[ 355 ]
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two trees, portions of which were then combined into one). Similarly, if
human beings were made up of merely animal bodies that had had human
souls “grafted” onto them by God in mid-pregnancy, we simply could not
say they had existed as human individuals from conception. Grafting,
like other construction, involves discontinuity, while development brings
about change within a continuous identity.
This idea of development—as the continual presence but gradual
manifestation of the nature of the same living thing—lies deep within us, no
doubt the result of tens of thousands of years of observation by humans of
the natural world around them. Look at the word “develop” itself. “De-velop” could be considered the opposite of “en-vel-op,” uncover and cover,
show forth and veil. In some other languages this contrast is even clearer.
In German, to develop is ent-wickeln, to unwrap, in contrast to wickeln
or ein-wickeln, to roll or wrap up. In Spanish, des-arrollar (to develop)
is a negation of arrollar (to roll up). In development, that which was in
some mysterious way previously present but hidden becomes uncovered,
unveiled, unwrapped, unfolded, unfurled, unrolled, or otherwise made
manifest. This is the fundamental idea of development in our Western
linguistic consciousness.
This meaning of development was relied upon when the German
Constitutional Court repeatedly affirmed the constitutional right to life of
the unborn child, even in quite early embryonic stages.21 A 1975 decision
spoke of the legal irrelevance of distinctions among the various stages
“of self-developing life” (sich entwickelnden Lebens) (39 BVerfGE 1, 37
(First Senate 1975)). Reaffirming most of that earlier judgment, the court
in 1993 wrote that discussion of the unborn concerns
. . . an individual life, one that in the process of growing and unfolding
itself does not develop into a human being but rather develops as a human
being. . . . It concerns . . . the necessary stages of the development of an
individual human existence. Where human life exists, to it belongs human
dignity . . . the dignity of human being . . . its own right to life. . . . (88
BVerfGE 203, 251–252 (1993) (author’s translation))22

Here is how the German Court had elaborated its non-constructionist
position in 1975:
The process of development . . . does not end even with birth; the
phenomena of consciousness which are specific to the human personality,
for example, appear for the first time a rather long time after birth.
Therefore, the protection . . . of the Basic Law cannot be limited either to
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the “completed” human being after birth or to the child about to be born
which is independently capable of living. . . . [N]o distinction can be made
here between various stages of the life developing itself before birth, or
between unborn and born life. (Jonas and Gorby 1976, 638)

Though the concept of development is fully at home only in the description
of living organisms, an analogy to photographic “development” can
perhaps make its normative import clearer. (Note that Spanish would use
“revelar” [literally “reveal,” rather than “develop”] for the photographic
process in this story; we are dealing here with a concept for the revelation
of something previously hidden, not just with the conventional usage or
etymology of the particular word “develop.”)
Suppose that someone is on a trip with her spouse in Chiapas, Mexico,
and she snaps a picture with their old-fashioned Polaroid camera. (As
may be recalled, within minutes after each Polaroid snapshot, the finished
print would develop in an envelope. After opening the envelope, the print
could then be directly examined and passed around.) Now suppose further
that the picture she has taken is of something reasonably believed to be
unique and valuable (as we say each individual human being is unique and
valuable). Let us say it was a photo of a jaguar darting out of the jungle
for only a second, something not likely to happen again on their trip.
But her husband in his eagerness grabs the envelope out of their camera
and rips it open too quickly, thus permanently stopping the photo’s
development at a very early stage. Since her jaguar picture is now forever
gone (old Polaroids not retaining any negative or other copy), she is
naturally very upset with him.
Would this be a good defense for him to use? “Look, honey, I didn’t
really do much harm anyway. Your picture was still at the brown smudge
stage when I wrecked it. You surely don’t care much about brown smudges,
do you?”
Not only would this argument be unacceptable to her, she would not
even understand it; her spouse would appear to be talking gibberish. She
thought she had a photo of a jaguar, not a brown smudge. The chemicals
present just needed time to rearrange themselves to become a picture
manifest to a viewer.
The Polaroid story is, of course, in many ways not analogous to embryo
research (or to abortion). It serves here only to demonstrate that the first
stages of an entity’s ongoing development may have virtually the same
value as the last stage of the entity’s development.
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Given a similar concept of development in the minds of those who
oppose embryo destruction, the words of journalist Michael Kinsley,
quoted earlier, should seem to them likewise to amount nearly to gibberish.
To compare a developing human embryo to a “rock” or a “worm,” because
that is what it happens on the surface to resemble at the moment, should
appear to developmentalists quite irrational, just as their position would
necessarily appear nonsensical from his constructionist viewpoint. The
humanity of a developing embryo—and not just its humanity in general
(or essential humanity) but also its particular humanity (sex, race, likely
height, even special talents, etc.)—seems to them present from conception
rather than something to be added on from the outside in the course of
gestation. For constructionists, the embryo is only a first step toward
making a human being; for their opponents, the embryo is a human
being taking his or her first developmental step.23 To try to justify embryo
destruction or early abortion by pointing out that there are still more
steps to go (organs to develop, viability to achieve, and the like) appears
to those opponents as logically irrelevant as to point out that the jaguar
picture had still not developed beyond the brown smudge stage.24
We have now completed the two parts of the first task assigned at the
start of this essay; we have shown how it can be that each side in the
embryo research debate can consider itself wholly rational and the other
side wholly irrational. Our next task, it will be recalled, is to see how
both models can survive in the modern world, and indeed (as we shall see)
how both can survive in the minds of those on each side of the embryo
research debate.
III. WHY DO BOTH MODELS SURVIVE IN THE MODERN WORLD?

The construction model was the leading understanding of early gestation
in the pre-modern era, as we have seen.25 The great historical advantage
held by constructionist thought is, however, counterbalanced by sizable
disadvantages. Very few modern scholars, even or especially among those
otherwise more traditional, still hold to the biologies taught by Aristotle or
the Bible.26 A model of embryo construction is difficult to formulate in an
academic world that no longer admits the possible agency of soul-infused
semen or divine intervention. Who or what would do the constructing?
Moreover, the existence of the ovum and the truth about the mutual
male–female contributions to conception are now known. Once the union
of gametes and the developmental role of genes became clear, there was
no longer any theoretical need even to search for an outside constructor
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(paternal, divine, or whatever) of unborn human bodies. Embryos could
now be thought to develop on their own, given the proper environment,
from conception all the way to maturity. In other words, developmentalism
now appears to have seized almost the whole process of gestation, in that
the last chance or construction event, the last event where a making could
possibly occur, would seem to be the union of sperm and ovum, or the
insertion and activation of a cell nucleus in the case of cloning.27
An even greater problem for constructionism is this: in the end, life
appears difficult or impossible to construct from parts. Something merely
put together, or otherwise made, does not hold itself in being, does not
monitor and govern itself in the way living organisms do. An “in-dividual,” a being unified and indivisible, cannot be composed of unrelated parts
that some outside force has simply pushed together into a certain shape
and then abandoned. Here the inadequacy of the Polaroid analogy must
be pointed out. We can speak reasonably of photographic development
revealing an image or form previously present though hidden. But this
“developed” image has no power to maintain itself or to maintain any
print in which it appears. If someone scratches it, it will not repair itself,
restoring the damaged image, any more than a constructed house or car
can put itself back together after some accident. A photographic print may
go through a process in some way like biological development, but the
final result is much more like a construction than like a living organism—
for besides developing themselves, living organisms, to a large degree,
maintain themselves in being, heal their own scratches, and restore their
own health. A living being actively resists its own decomposition, until
the moment of its death, while a car or a photo does not.
If a contemporary constructionist cannot envision a qualitative change
from constructed thing to living creature to take place during gestation,
then she will not envision the unborn fetus ever to be truly alive. Even if it
finally fulfills her subjective criteria for counting as a living human being,
the fact that it appears to be merely constructed means that it cannot be
fully appreciated as a living human being, for its form will not seem to
sustain itself. Put another way, no mere construction can, at any stage,
be as fully alive as a developing being is from the first moment of its
active development, for only the latter contains and gradually manifests
its own form. Perhaps this is the explanation for the curious absence of
passionate anti-abortion-in-mid-or-late-pregnancy activists, the absence
of any great campaigns to forbid late abortion by persons indifferent to,
or supportive of, early abortion. All or almost all anti-abortion activists
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oppose abortion throughout pregnancy, while those who say they oppose
abortion only after some point in mid-pregnancy are rarely or never
activists (though they may hold and express anti-late-abortion views).
If the latter are constructionists, and construction alone cannot generate
life, then their lack of passionate opposition to late-term abortion makes
sense. Yes, the fetus now meets their definition of a human being, but it
still does not seem to them really alive because they still define it rather
than it defining itself.
Ancient and medieval thinkers started with construction, but they
knew that, sometime during pregnancy, the unborn child became master
of its own being. Thus they supposed the infusion of an active, formmaintaining, rational soul (a scientific hypothesis, not an appeal to faith,
it will be recalled) as the last step from construction to development, from
fabrication to human existence. The leap thus posited was nearly as radical
as the human body’s later transition from life to death, which involved in
turn the loss of the same form-maintaining soul. In order to keep using
a similar construction model in early pregnancy, but still end up with a
living being later in pregnancy, or after birth, today’s constructionists
might have to find a like point of biological bifurcation, a like qualitative
change from inert object to active subject at some early stage of life.
(To be most convincing, this profound shift would probably have to
occur by around the end of the first three months of pregnancy, when,
even to a layperson, there is a miniature but growing and recognizably
human body that clearly maintains and develops its own form, so that
further “construction” becomes difficult to envision.) But no such radical
disjunction during the process of gestation is widely known, or known
at all.28 How, then, can many or most people in our secular society still
“see a fetus as an individual under construction,” in the words of Dalton
Conley cited at the beginning of this essay?
Perhaps modern constructionists know about development but think
of it simply as self-construction. The active design found in the human
genotype could be said to construct the human phenotype. But this neat
dualism, even if biologically tenable, could not reduce the embryo just to
a constructed object, for even in this dualist conception each new living
organism would contain the sculptor as well as the sculpted. Each embryo
would have both genotype and phenotype entwined within it, giving the
embryo as a whole a particular human identity from the beginning. In
other words, the embryo must already be human in order to construct
itself as human. A non-living entity under construction lacks the identity
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of its final form because that form must still be imposed from the outside.
But an embryo supposedly “constructing itself” possesses the active
fundamentals of that form within itself from its beginning, already giving
it a particular human identity.
Moreover, such dualism is not in fact tenable. Genes do not construct a
body out of passive matter. Causation is sometimes reversed; the organic
environment may tell certain genes in a cell whether to be active or passive.
For example, differing nearby cells, or differing external conditions, may
cause initially identical genes to act quite differently, a process often
referred to as epigenesis. There is no way to separate the constructor and
the constructed within an organism.29
Knowledgeable defenders of embryo research might pick up on the
process of epigenetics in a broader sense in order to emphasize that
development is thus not similar to the unveiling or revealing of a tiny
homunculus, as some thought in early modernity (Jones 2004, 165–68),
nor even to the revealing of an exact pre-set image found in the genetic
code, but involves construction in part from the outside. Because the
developing embryo (and indeed all life) responds to (learns from)
opportunities, and the lack thereof, within its environment as well as within
itself, defenders of embryo research might say that some “constructive
credit” in every successful development belongs to that environment, not
to the developing organism.
However, although it is certainly true that at every stage of life,
including adulthood, organisms exist in dependency and interaction
with their surroundings, developing life is the key formative element in
each interchange, and this self-informing capability is present from the
beginning (Moratalla and Martínez-Priego 2002, 193–224). The presence
or absence of water may greatly influence the development of both plants
and puppies, but they use water in different ways.
In our technological age, some might be attracted to constructionism
because they feel that we are near to creating life, or near to creating
machines that can behave much like living creatures. The line between
construction and development might seem to them soon to be blurred if
not erased.
Still, the whole point of creating biological life would surely be to
initiate the sort of being that cannot be understood as merely put and held
together by its constructors. Artificially created life would still have to have
a nature of its own, with its self-maintenance and further development
thus no longer artificial, or else it would not count as life.
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Advances in artificial intelligence would seem at first sight a more
promising explanation of the survival of the constructionist model, for here
the hope is not just that life can be artificially initiated, but that its very
nature can be through and through a construction of human ingenuity.30
Could we not eventually develop non-mechanistic machines, machines that
had the capability to learn on their own, machines that could not only
maintain and repair themselves but even develop new abilities—like the
ability to think as we do—“epigenetically,” based on opportunities, or the
lack of them, in themselves or in their environments? Perhaps yes, though
the task would be far more formidable than anything so far created by us
in our machines or even in our thoughts; the sheer intelligence that has
evolved in the organization and development of even the simplest plants
and animals may well exceed that of the greatest human minds. However,
even if it were possible for us to pierce the veil that hides the nature of
life, including intelligent life, we would not have changed that nature. We
would just have constructed machines that truly live, that are masters of
their own being, that gradually manifest themselves, albeit perhaps starting
from a base in silicon rather than in carbon. We will have created entities
that are not mere constructions but instead are developing beings. The
progressive changes in, and the eventual acts of, those machines will, as
a result, have to be understood using the development model rather than
the construction model of change. If you will, we shall have become like
God, but, precisely for this reason, the highest sort of creatures we can
or will construct (like God’s own creations) in the end will have rational
natures like ours—natures that guide their development from their very
beginnings to the full manifestation of reason. We might well feel a kinship
and awe for the directing power found even in the early stages of the
thinking-capable machines we would have engendered, and so refrain
from destroying them, just as many developmentalists feel kinship and
awe for the embryos we now engender (because those embryos from their
first beginnings have just such an active rational nature).
Yet another explanation for the survival of constructionism may lie in
the fact that, although the human body may develop from conception, the
human mind is to a very great degree a familial and cultural construction.
Nowhere is this clearer than in the acquiring of a language. Every human
being is internally designed to speak, from the moment of conception,
but the particular language spoken is given to each by that person’s
linguistic group. This externally-added facet of consciousness is not
merely an unformed resource, like water, that is used and shaped solely
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by the developing human. Each language has an elaborate structure of its
own long before it is picked up by an individual. Moreover, we cannot
speak at all without learning a particular language; a boy being raised by
wolves would never talk in more than a rudimentary way. The capability
for speech, therefore, is both an active and a passive potentiality. Speech
requires genuine co-formation of our manifest humanity from both inside
and outside ourselves. In this sense, it seems correct to claim that human
beings (individuals, persons) are to a significant degree constructed entities.
What develops from the inside, however, meshes well with what must
be constructed from the outside. (A cup can be said to be ready for water
even though it cannot fill itself. Once the roof beams are in place, a
building already has incorporated a certain roof design, though the roof
itself remains absent.) Speech remains a natural human development, even
though it cannot emerge without the artifact of a particular language. And
so the ontological “longing” for speech remains intact even when it is
frustrated. Human beings who temporarily or permanently lack the ability
to speak—e.g., those living among wolves or those in a coma—do not
and cannot lose their inner directedness toward speaking. The frustration
of this inner purposiveness, i.e., of their constant and continuing human
nature, is what makes the conditions of the wolf-child and the comatose
person tragic (as bestial and vegetative, respectively). We do not shake
our heads sadly and remark, “Look at that poor wolf behaving like an
animal,” or “Pity that spruce just vegetating there in the forest,” because
there is no frustrated human nature present. There can be no tragedy where
the wolf and tree are able fully to express their own non-human natures.
Similarly, the reality of a certain amount of post-birth “sculpting”
(by society) of the human mind cannot easily account for the survival
of a constructionist model of the creation of human beings, for we
are committed (both politically and in our deepest intuitions) to the
recognition of full human dignity long before any construction of qualities
like language is complete many years after birth. That is, we commonly
recognize human dignity in very young children despite the fact that they
will be able to act in a fully human way only far in the future, after much
socialization. Even though the human potential found in a child may not
be able to develop fully without some outside formation, John Rawls,
for example, regards “the potentiality as sufficient,” for children to have
human rights:
[T]he minimal requirements defining moral personality refer to a capacity
and not to the realization of it. A being that has this capacity, whether or
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not it is yet developed, is to receive the full protection of the principles of
justice. (1971, 509; emphasis added)31

Newborn children for a considerable time after birth cannot think and
love; we treasure and protect them because they have been conceived by
us and because of what they are on the way to becoming. We delight in a
baby’s smile as a harbinger of human love because we know he or she is a
being designed for the love we will show and teach them. We care about
our offspring for their full potential, not just for what they can already
do, nor just for the truncated abilities they could manifest if left without
outside guidance. That is, we are committed to giving them credit for their
latent capabilities, even though we know those capabilities will be formed
in part by parents and society.
Putting the same point negatively: to insist upon the actual construction
and functioning of personal human consciousness (not just the inner
design for human consciousness) before recognition of a human right to
life would be to authorize the killing of human beings already born to us,
something quite unacceptable to the moral intuition of most.32 Few of us
would turn surplus newborns over to science for lethal experimentation,
even though those traits that make our species special have not yet been
realized in them. Moreover, to treat newborns as not yet human would
require deep changes in our lives and in our understanding of the world.
We could no longer celebrate “our” birthdays—for we would not yet have
come into existence when our mothers gave birth to the things that were
later used to construct us.
IV. THE INTUITIVE IMPASSE

Yet even if constructionism could win some or all of the theoretical
debates described above, this victory could not fully account for the force
that constructionist views appear to have in America today, and this for
two reasons: first, it seems doubtful that most people are familiar with such
esoteric debates, and yet, if Professor Conley is right, a construction model
of gestation makes sense to “most Americans.” Second, constructionism is
so strong that many, like Michael Kinsley, think the developmental view
makes no sense at all. But anyone familiar with the above debates would
surely concede a degree of cognitive merit to the developmental arguments.
Therefore, something else must be stirring, or perhaps quieting, the minds
of those who seem wholly oblivious to the developmental perspective in
early pregnancy. Despite the absence of any likely intrauterine constructor
or maker, constructionism appears strongly to endure among many who
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claim to understand embryonic life.33 What can account for the enduring
appeal of the idea that the embryo, like the car on the assembly line, is
indubitably to be identified only by those of its parts that are already
manifest?
One simple answer amounts to an accusation: defenders of embryo
research (and abortion) who are well educated must be acting in bad faith.
Although it remained an intelligent hypothesis for many centuries, the
construction model cannot be sincerely held, even unconsciously, by any
thinking person today. Defenders of embryo research must be claiming
that human identity is lacking in the embryo only because they do not
wish the research to stop and, at the same time, do not wish to be seen to
be attacking widely shared principles that affirm the dignity, equality, or
inviolability of all human beings.
This simple answer is, however, too simple. It is a one-sided conversationstopper that ignores the significant attraction that the construction model
continues to have for those on both sides of these debates.
Opponents of abortion themselves commonly resort to constructionist
arguments, often pointing out that fetuses that have been aborted had
already manifested some of the essentials of human life; witness the
common bumper sticker that proclaims “Abortion stops a beating heart.”
Is this just a political attempt by developmentalists to garner support
among those constructionists who consider a heartbeat necessary and
sufficient to indicate life, even though developmentalists themselves really
see no difference between killing an embryo without a heartbeat and a
fetus with a heartbeat? Jon Shields has noted further that pro-lifers in
general devote much more time to stopping abortion than to stopping
lethal embryo research (2011, 507).34 Again, this could be only a matter
of politics, a choice by developmentalists to concentrate on an area where
many constructionists will likely lend some support. But Shields has also
presented evidence that precisely the most militant opponents of pre-natal
killing find abortion to be much more deplorable after the first trimester of
pregnancy (2011, 509–10).35 In further support of Shields’ contention that
even pro-lifers think the stage of pregnancy to be a sensible consideration,
we may note that research for this essay found many examples of defenders
of embryo research who consider their opponents’ position absurd, while
far fewer examples were discovered of anti-research people who lament the
utter absurdity of the position of those who favor this research. Could it be
that, in their heart of hearts, even developmentalists have constructionist
intuitions with regard to the earliest stages of gestation?
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The author of this very essay finds himself pulled in both directions.
Kinsley’s comparisons of the embryo to a rock or worm seem to him
sometimes sensible and sometimes nonsensical. How can this be? How
can the constructionist view on occasion seem intuitively plausible,
while at other times what appears to be the more scientifically accurate
developmental view makes more intuitive sense?
Perhaps the constructionist view is intuitively more appealing whenever
the future is shut out of our minds. Whenever the embryo or fetus is
visualized simply in terms of its current appearance, it is easy to fall into
constructionism. No photograph, for example, can depict the dynamic
inner self-direction of an embryo. So if a shapshot is taken, the embryo
looks like nothing more than a ball of cells. It seems inert, for its future is
hidden. Because an entity that had merely embryonic characteristics as its
natural end state would indeed not qualify as a human being, it is easy to
imagine that the entity in the shapshot is not human. Scientific knowledge
of its inner activity may not be enough to overcome this impression, for it
is hard to recognize—or even to imagine—a nature or design still hidden
from view.36
There may be a still greater difficulty. Whatever intuitive problems
we may have in general with envisioning radical metamorphosis, with
seeing substantial future change in form to be a development rather than
a construction, with recognizing mere sprouts to be developing spruces
or caterpillars to be developing butterflies, it seems nigh to impossible to
think of the sprout or the caterpillar as a particular or individual spruce
tree or butterfly. But this is how human beings have to be imagined by
us. We normally think of other creatures generically, as just a certain type
of tree or insect, but we think of humans as specific individuals, albeit
ones whose individuality may happen to be unknown to us. Because the
embryo in the photo cannot (except arbitrarily) be ascribed any particular
characteristics, it cannot easily be thought of as a developing individual.
The scientific fact that “This embryo can grow up to be an adult human
being” is too abstract. We have all seen plain trees and butterflies, but
none of us has ever seen a plain (i.e., non-individuated) adult human.
If we could someday analyze an embryo’s genetic and epigenetic
structure and conclude, “This embryo will grow up to be a petite Asian
woman with considerable artistic talent,” the development model might
well become intuitively more compelling.37 (In a similar way, although
“brown smudge” might initially seem a reasonable description of an early
stage of development of a Polaroid photo, those words are obviously not
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an adequate description of a photo once we know it to be on its way to
becoming a particular sort of picture, that of the jaguar we glimpsed flashing
momentarily out of the jungle.) Or perhaps (despite the uncertainties of
epigenesis) a computer could someday read off a visual image from her
genetic and other characteristics and show us her likeness—even her very
face38—as a baby, little girl, teenager, or adult. A consensus opposed to
violence against embryonic human beings might then more easily emerge.
As long as we are not able to foretell embryonic destinies, however, we
will have the paradox that the construction model for radical gestational
change makes intuitive sense when looking forward to the future while the
development model makes more sense when looking back to the past—
precisely because as we look back we already know the future that the
developing entity once held within it. We may doubt that a new sprout,
or even a barren vine, is really a tomato plant, but once it bears tomatoes,
we know that it was always a tomato plant. We may doubt that embryos
are persons, but as we look back upon ourselves or upon our neighbors,
we recognize that we and they were all once embryos. An embryo may
at first seem like a little round rock as we look at a photograph, but if
that embryo snapshot was taken twenty years ago, just after our friend
Mary was conceived in vitro, we may well exclaim to her, “Look, Mary.
That’s you!”
Thinkers on each side of the debates about early human life have
agreed that the identity—and any accompanying dignity—of life over
time becomes much more compelling when we look back into the past.
Philosopher Jeffrey Reiman, a defender of abortion, acknowledges
regretfully that
we tend to read a kind of personal identity backwards into fetuses, and
personal identity carries connotations of moral identity beyond mere
physical identity. . . . Just because it is so natural to us to think that way, I
believe that this ‘retroactive empersonment’ is the single greatest source of
confusion in the abortion debate. (1999, 92)

Abortion opponent Oliver O’Donovan puts the same point well when
he writes, “[T]hose . . . yet unborn become known to us as persons when
they are children. . . .” (1998, 384; emphasis in original). We come to
know embryos as persons when we come to know the child-persons who
first came into existence as embryos.
Political advocates on either side of the embryonic stem-cell research
debate seem to know where their strengths lie. Defenders of this research
have focused on the minimal already-manifest characteristics of embryos,
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pointing out, for example, that the “embryos destroyed in stem-cell
research do not have brains, or even neurons” (Harris 2007, 29). At the
same time, opponents of embryonic stem cell research have pressed the
continuity of identity that is more visible in hindsight: The United States
Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) a few years ago made widely
available an ad with a picture of a newborn baby and the caption “270
days ago, Joshua was just an embryo.” The text went on to emphasize
that “embryonic stem cells . . . come with a heavy price tag: they are only
obtained by destroying a living human embryo. An embryo like Joshua,
270 days ago.”39 In 2010, Irish opponents put up billboards with photos
of many stages of life, from embryonic to elderly, and the words “YOU.
ME. EVERYBODY. WE’RE ALL JUST GROWN-UP EMBRYOS.”40
Such arguments by the opponents of embryo-destructive research are
fundamentally cognitive, not emotional. They are attempts to wrap our
minds more fully around the developmental model, attempts to overcome
our difficulty in imagining that one and the same organism may, in the
future, undergo radical changes in outward form. They work (if they do
work) by first looking backward from fully developed persons, where the
continuity of personal identity is concrete and easy to see, and then very
quickly looking forward from still undeveloped embryos, in the hope that
their future continuity of identity will be easier to imagine.
These anti-research arguments are cognitive in yet another sense, a sense
in which the counter-arguments used by the defenders of embryo research
are non-cognitive. Our forward-looking intuition that an embryo is like a
rock depends on our ignoring (not necessarily out of insincerity but rather
because of a limit to our imaginations) what we actually know about the
embryo. Jon Shields has put this point quite well:
[To say that] embryos are merely “clumps of cells” . . . tends to obscure
scientific truth itself. This characterization suggests that an embryo is not
biologically different than what we might find under our fingernails if we
were to gouge a bit of skin from under our arms. It is to imply erroneously
that they lack coherence, integrity, and self-direction as organisms. (2007,
19)41

Our backward-looking intuition, by contrast, is not only compatible
with but actually depends upon modern scientific knowledge. It is only
because of this knowledge that we can point to an old photo of an embryo
and say, “That was you, Mary, when you were newly conceived.” Someone
who believed that Mary first came into existence in mid-pregnancy when
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God grafted a rational soul onto a previously subhuman fetus would not,
could not, point to the embryo in the photo and say “That was you, Mary.”
Notes

1. This article is an expanded revision of “Construcción vs. desarrollo: la raíz
de nuestros malentendidos sobre el principio de la vida” (2008). An early version of Craig Payne’s essay, “The Difference Between Form and Shape: Why
Human Appearance Is Morally Irrelevant” (2013) was of great assistance, as
were cogent critiques of earlier drafts by James Hanink, Gilbert Meilaender,
Jeffrey Reiman, Stephen Schwarz, and Jeremy Telman, among others. A
fuller exposition of the author’s own understanding of individual identity
can be found in “The Priority of Respect: How Our Common Humanity
Can Ground Our Individual Dignity” (2004), translated and revised as “La
prioridad del respeto: cómo nuesta humanidad común puede fundamentar
nuestra dignidad individual” (2010).
2. Another reason for the seeming intractability of the abortion debates, besides
disagreement about the content of moral rules, is that they sometimes center
around the meaning of the word “person.” One the one hand, there is our
practice of considering all (but not only) human beings to be persons, perhaps
reflecting the ancient Boethian philosophical realism holding that a person is
“an individual substance of a rational nature” (Boethius 2004). At the other
extreme is our practice of stipulating who or what is a person simply for the
sake of conferring legal standing, without regard to the nature of the object
so labeled. In between lie an immense number of possible mixtures of realism and nominalism, including somewhere the influential Western religious
tradition that finds three persons in a single God. Primarily in order to avoid
such complexity, this essay speaks only of how “human beings,” or sometimes
“individuals,” come to be. But a valiant reader is welcome to take the essay
to concern two models for the genesis of persons, one that sees persons being
constructed and another that sees persons developing.
3. Udo Schüklenk, who as co-editor of Bioethics should know the arguments
on both sides, treats as reasonable the claim
that embryos 10–14 days after conception really are nothing more
than accumulations of a few hundred cells. . . . [We should not] treat
a few hundred cells as if they were people, because these cells [are] so
evidently not people to begin with. Why should one treat something
as if it were something else that patently it is not? (2008, ii; emphasis
added).
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(Note especially Schüklenk’s use of the term “accumulations;” accumulating
is at best a making, if not just a formless piling up.) In the same vein, Robert
Pasnau writes that “it is surely absurd to think that a few unformed cells count
as a human being” (2002, 120; emphasis added). Daniel Dombrowski and
Robert Deltete declare such thinking “ridiculous” in the context of abortion
(2000, 129). Law professor Geoffrey Stone is likewise simply dumbfounded
by the position of those who strongly oppose embryonic stem cell research.
In vetoing the bill that would have funded stem-cell research, President
Bush invoked what he termed a “conflict between science and ethics.”
But what, exactly, is the “ethical” side of this conflict? Clearly, it
derives from the belief that an embryo smaller than a period on this
page is a “human life”—indeed, a human life that is as valuable as
those of living, breathing, suffering children. And what, exactly, is the
basis of this belief? Is it Science? Reason? Logic? Tradition? Morals?
None-of-the-above? What the President describes neutrally as “ethics”
is simply his own, sectarian religious belief. (2006, 27)
I doubt very much that Professor Stone actually investigated President Bush’s
Methodist “sect” and discovered that its creed prohibits embryonic stem cell
research. (It does not.) His allegation of a religious doctrine appears to come,
fairly enough, at the end of an exasperated process of elimination.
4. Children at the “artificialism” stage of cognitive development often imagine
piece-by-piece baby-making. They have been called “manufacturers” in that
they tend to think of reproduction as an additive process: “You just make
the baby first. You put some eyes on it. You put the head on, and hair. . . .”
(Bernstein and Cowan 1981, 14). A subsequent study found this tendency
to hold across four cultures, with Jesus, God, the doctor, or the father doing the manufacturing. See Goldman and Goldman 1982, p. 494. However,
while the researchers in the first study asked neutrally, “How do people get
babies?” Bernstein and Cowan (1981), supra at 13, the later researchers
asked a leading question, one favoring a constructionist answer: “How are
babies made?” (emphasis added), Goldman and Goldman, supra, at 493.
5. The construction model here described contains two elements: a constructive design and a thing being constructed. This two-part model appears to
be widely present in historical and current scientific–political–moral debates
surrounding gestation, as discussed below. But a one-part model could be
operative in the minds of some observers. That is, a constructive design might
be thought absent, so that the realization of the resultant entity must be ascribed to physical necessity and chance (and perhaps also to the survival only
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of the fit). This, indeed, was one hypothesis entertained by Aristotle in his
Physics (1970; book ii, chapter 8) before he settled definitively on the idea of
a teleological “nature” at work in each living being. Many or all of us believe
in the accidental genesis and growth of, say, a tornado or hurricane. We do
not think anybody or anything to be making it; it just sometimes happens
by a mixture of climatic regularities and (bad) luck. However, even if such a
view were widely held and plausible today with regard to human gestation,
it would have little relevance to the task at hand, which is to explain how it
can seem absolutely nonsensical to claim that a human being exists from the
beginning of pregnancy. Like automobiles, tornados exist only when they are
essentially complete. (Furthermore, we may well disagree about the point at
which that happens: what speed must the wind have reached? Must the cone
have touched ground?) The humans-exist-from-conception claim must seem
quite as absurd to anyone who reduces gestation to necessity and chance as
it does to those who liken gestation to construction.
6. For a fine survey of the (commonly constructionist) ideas of human gestation held throughout history, see Jones 2004. Ancient non-constructionist
approaches still linger in language that speaks of the male “seed” (semen in
Latin) being placed in a “fertile” woman.
7. See also Psalm 139 (138): 13–14 (New Revised Standard Version): “For it
was you who formed my inward parts; you knit me together in my mother’s
womb. I praise you, for I am fearfully and wonderfully made.” The Bible
elsewhere states that God knew us before forming us in the womb (Jeremiah
1:5), meaning perhaps that we existed in some way prior to God’s construction
of our body, or meaning only that we were known in the way God knows
the whole future in advance.
8. Biblical thought is constructionist on a still deeper level: God “created”
(made, constructed) the heavens and earth, and the earth had previously been
“formless” (Gen. 1:1–2; New Revised Standard Version). (This vision stands
in sharp contrast to that of Aristotle, where there is no creator of the universe.
On its own, form either presents itself eternally, in the cosmos, or replicates
itself eternally, in living organisms.) Although constructionism thus stretches
back thousands of years, and is present in the Bible, research for this article
has been unable to discover any period in which a certain view of gestation
or point of soul infusion was taught as a dogma in Christianity. The biblical
references are poetic in tone, rather than authoritative, and Aquinas seems to
have been untroubled by the fact that those biblical passages did not exactly
harmonize with his own partly constructionist exposition of gestation. The
existence of an individual life from the moment of fertilization of maternal
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9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

egg by paternal sperm could, of course, hardly have been conceived, much less
required by faith, as long as the existence of the human ovum itself was still
uncertain, i.e., until the early nineteenth century, around the time that Karl
Ernst von Baer spoke of its reproductive role in his path-breaking Epistola
de Ovo Mammalium et Hominis Genesi (Leipzig, 1827). Kevin O’Rourke
points out that even today there is no official Catholic dogma concerning a
point of ensoulment (2006, 249–50). The apparent absence of any binding
religious revelation or settled dogma on any side of the embryonic research
debate bodes well for the eventual achievement of consensus through public
reason. But cf. the Vatican statement Dignitas personae that seems to be
edging toward a declaration of personhood or ensoulment from conception (Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith 2008; hereafter Dignitas
personae).
This is a commonplace image. For example, webmd.com states: “By the
end of the third month of pregnancy, your baby is fully formed. Your baby
has arms, hands, fingers, feet, and toes and can open and close its fists and
mouth. Fingernails and toenails are beginning to develop and the external
ears are formed. The beginnings of teeth are forming” (last visited Aug. 6,
2012). Babycentre.com.uk explains: “At 13 weeks your baby is about 6.7cm
long from crown to rump. She weighs about 23g and is fully formed. She has
begun swallowing and kicking. All her organs and muscles have formed and
are beginning to function. Tiny fingerprints are now at the tips of her fingers.
All this month, your baby’s facial muscles are getting a workout as her tiny
features form one expression after another” (last visited Aug. 6, 2012).
A Gallup poll published on August 8, 2011, found that 52% of “pro-choice”
respondents favored making abortion illegal in the second trimester of pregnancy, and 79% would do so in the third trimester (while 89% of pro-choice
people wanted it legal in the first trimester) (Saad 2011).
As of 2004, the United States, Canada, Netherlands, and Sweden were apparently the only Western democracies that extended abortion on request beyond
twelve weeks (Sweden only to eighteen weeks) (Levine 2004, 135–37).
The late Ronald Dworkin has shown how a slightly different sort of constructionist thinking can give work-in-progress (but still non-personal) value to a
fetus. He suggests that the investment already made, by the parents or even
by nature, in such a noble project should not be wasted unless an abortion
is necessary for some greater good (1993). For a lengthy argument against
Dworkin’s theory of value, see Stith 1997.
The authors of the court’s opinions interpret the Irish constitution to provide
protection only for an embryo that remains within the womb of its “mother.”
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None focuses upon the identical nature of embryos inside and outside the
womb. That is, the judges appear to think the object of constitutional protection to be a relationship rather than a being.
14. The question of how to describe the inactive (usually permanently inactive)
ungerminated spruce seed is discussed infra, note 20. Because that inactive
state is not perceived as developing, however, it is not useful here for the
purpose of understanding the idea of development.
15. “Develop” in this essay is an intransitive (“the fetus is developing”) or reflexive (“the fetus is developing itself”) verb referring to self-development, to
the process in which a being develops itself from within, albeit usually with
resources (energy, water, nutrients) obtained from outside itself—for it is only
this sort of development that can easily accommodate the biological facts
(discussed below) and, more importantly for this essay, can account well for
the point of view of the strong opponents of embryonic stem cell research.
As a matter of linguistic usage, the word can, of course, be used transitively
(“the mother is developing the fetus”). It is often so used to cover non-living
entities that may be constructed in large part from the outside, as in the case
of someone “developing a theme” or an aid-giver “developing a country’s
economy.” But, even in such cases, the word “develop” still connotes some
inward form being carried forward (gives part of the “credit,” so to speak, to
the theme rather than to the person elaborating upon it, and to the country
rather than to any foreign aid it is receiving). Occasionally, however, a word
like “development” may even be used to refer fairly precisely to construction.
Judith Jarvis Thomson may slip into this use when she writes confusingly,
“[I]f children are allowed to develop normally they will have a right to vote;
that does not show that they now have the right to vote” (1995), and Robert
George and Christopher Tollefsen, in an otherwise excellent book, call hers
“the developmental view” of what happens during pregnancy (2008, 115–16).
But the right to vote would seem to be something given by democratic societies
(and not by other societies) to each adult human, i.e., something added from
the outside rather than developing from the inside of each human being, so
the Thomson–George–Tollefson use of the word “development” is hard to
understand.
16. Note that both constructionism and developmentalism differ from reductionism (which holds that the form of any whole is an illusion, in that only the
separate parts of the apparent whole really exist) and from vitalism (which
holds that a separate and non-material life force turns mere things into living
organisms). Both (in contrast to reductionism) find a role for form to play,
and neither (in contrast to vitalism) need envision any non-material life force
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to be playing a role (although a certain Aristotelian–Thomistic subset of
constructionists could be said to treat the infused soul as a vitalist principle).
17. While the current version of this paper was being prepared, in a serendipitous
confluence of independent work, Maureen Condic, Associate Professor of
Neurobiology and Anatomy at the University of Utah School of Medicine,
published a useful essay concerning the beginning of human life: see Condic
2008. The section entitled Does a human being control its own development
or is it manufactured? calls attention to the presence of constructionist (or
“manufacturing” in her words) thinking and contrasts that thinking with
(what she argues to be more accurate) developmental understanding. That
section deserves to be quoted at length:
[One] way of thinking about human development is compelling to
many because it is similar to our thinking about the much more
familiar process of manufacturing. A car is not a car until it rolls off
the assembly line—until then it is a bunch of parts in the process of
becoming a car, but not there yet. Similarly, a cake is not a cake until
it comes out of the oven—until then it is a variously gooey mass of
flour, sugar, eggs, and butter that is gradually becoming a cake.
However, a profound difference exists between manufacturing and
embryonic development. The difference is who (or what) is doing the
“producing.” The embryo is not something that is being passively
built by the process of development, with some unspecified, external
“builder” controlling the assembly of embryonic components. . . . The
organized pattern of development doesn’t produce the embryo; it is
produced by the embryo as a consequence of the zygote’s internal,
self-organized power. Indeed, this “totipotency,” or the power of the
zygote both to generate all the cells of the body and simultaneously
to organize those cells into coherent, interacting bodily structures, is
the defining feature of the embryo.
An additional problem with comparing [embryo development] to
manufacturing is that, unlike the building of an automobile, there
is no actual endpoint to the “building” of a human being. Human
development is an ongoing process that begins with the zygote and
continues seamlessly through embryogenesis, fetogenesis, birth,
maturation, and aging, ending only in death. Indeed, why consider the
entity present . . . at birth a human being, and not merely a “unique
collection of human cells in the process of becoming a new human,
but not there yet”? Once a concession has been made to the concept
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of manufacture and to an arbitrary point at which development has
proceeded “far enough” along the assembly line to generate a human
being, the precise positioning of this point becomes purely a matter of
preference, convenience, and the power to enforce one’s view.
In contrast, if the embryo comes into existence at sperm–egg fusion, a
human organism is fully present from the beginning, controlling and
directing all of the developmental events that occur throughout life.
This view of the embryo is objective, . . . and it is consistent with the
factual evidence. It is entirely independent of any specific ethical, moral,
political, or religious view of human life or of human embryos. Indeed,
this definition does not directly address the central ethical questions
surrounding the embryo: What value ought society to place on human
life at the earliest stages of development? . . . A neutral examination of
the factual evidence merely establishes the onset of a new human life
at a scientifically well-defined “moment of conception,” a conclusion
that unequivocally indicates that human embryos from the zygote stage
forward are indeed living individuals of the human species—human
beings. (Id. at 11–12; emphasis in original).
18. This sentence plays with the word “define,” pointing to the fact that a developing organism delimits itself physically, unless it is cancerous, and that
we must take such natural self-definition into account in defining our human world. See Kripke 1980, especially pp. 125–27, for more on the idea of
“natural kinds” to which our concepts conform.
19. Etymologically, the word “potential” is not inappropriate, related as it is
to a Latin word for “power.” But its passive and subjective connotations
make it misleading in this debate. Perhaps the predicate “capable” would be
more exact. A just-completed nuclear reactor could be said to be “capable”
of generating a great amount of energy, even if it will take a year for it to
develop sufficient heat to begin to do so. We could say that a teenager has
the talent or inner capability to become a great actor, even if it will still take
years of work for her to develop that talent. In the same way, we might say
that a human embryo or newborn child is the sort of being capable of choosing, reasoning, and loving, although he, she, or it will not actually be able
to do these things for some time to come. Though the word “capable” does
not precisely capture the idea of development, it does give the reactor, the
teenager, the embryo, and the newborn more of the “credit” they presently
merit, while “potential” either denies it to them or is at best ambiguous.
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20. There is a stage of plant life that appears (at least in our intuition) to stand
at the frontier between passive and active potential, and that is the seed. A
seed has an entire future within it and yet still does not develop itself. Thus
the slogan “An acorn is not an oak” may make sense to nearly everyone,
both constructionists and developmentalists, for even the latter may perceive
a continuity of being only after development has begun. (A German speaker
might not join quite so readily in this consensus: “Eine Eichel ist nicht eine
Eiche” may be less obviously true than “An acorn is not an oak,” for the
word Eichel is an old diminutive of the word Eiche. At least at the time the
word “Eichel” was first formed, some sort of identity between the two seems
to have been perceived.) However, developmentalists could deny any close
analogy between acorn and embryo, precisely because the acorn, unlike
the embryo, is inert. In order to begin to develop, an acorn seed needs one
or more catalysts added from the outside, probably warmth and water, to
cause it to germinate, to activate its potency—just as Frankenstein’s monster
needed an electric shock to come alive. That is, the acorn still needs a quasiconstructive step before development can begin. By contrast, animal life is
active and developing right after fertilization; it never goes through an inert
seedlike stage.
21. See Judgment of 25 February 1975, 39 BVerfGE 1 (First Senate) (F.R.G.),
translated in Jonas and Gorby 1976, pp. 605–84, and see Judgment of 28
May 1993, 88 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 203
(Second Senate), 1993 Europäische Grundrechte Zeitschrift [EuGRZ] 229.
22. Note particularly the developmental concept in the words “unfolding itself.”
The German original reads in fuller form
[H]andelt es sich bei dem Ungeborenen um individuelles . . . Leben,
das im Prozeβ des Wachsens und Sich-Entfaltens sich nicht erst zum
Menschen, sondern als Mensch entwickelt. . . . [E]s handelt sich . . . um
unabdingbare Stufen der Entwicklung eines individuellen Menschseins.
Wo menschliches Leben existiert, kommt ihm Menschenwürde zu. . . .
Diese Würde des Menschseins liegt auch für das ungeborene Leben
im Dasein um seiner selbst willen. Es zu achten und zu schützen
bedingt, daβ die Rechtsordnung die rechtlichen Voraussetzungen seiner
Entfaltung im Sinne eines eigenen Lebensrechts des Ungeborenen
gewährleistet. . . . Dieses Lebensrecht, das . . . dem Ungeborenen
schon aufgrund seiner Existenz zusteht, ist das elementare und
unveräuβerliche Recht, das von der Würde des Menschen ausgeht
. . . . Id.
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The degree of legal protection owed to the fetus is independent of the stage
of pregnancy. Id. at 254. The court adds that this conclusion is valid independently of any particular religious beliefs, concerning which the legal order
of a religion-and-worldview-neutral state can make no judgments. Id. at
252. The legal protection of each individual unborn life is a precondition for
ordered community, id. at 282, though such protection need not always be
via criminal law. Note that the court was not asked to consider the status of
the pre-implanted embryo, though its reasoning would seem to apply equally
prior to implantation, for self-development begins during or just after fertilization. (And German law does in fact protect even non-implanted embryos
against lethal experimentation. Embryonenschutzgesetz (ESchG) [Law on the
Protection of Embryos], Bundesgezetzblatt 1990 I: 2746. See Section 8(1) for
the definition of an embryo, which includes “the fertilized human egg cell
capable of development” [“die befruchtete, entwicklungsfähige menschliche
Eizelle”].) Note that from this non-constructionist point of view, as Donald
Kommers has pointed out, “the most non-religious Social Democrat could
agree with the most religious Christian Democrat” on the state’s duty to
protect the life of the unborn human throughout pregnancy (1994, 28). For
a further elaboration of the court’s complex decisions, see Stith 1997.
23. Could development be thought to begin earlier? If embryos are developing
human beings, could sperm cells or ova also be such? The answer is “no.” No
one nowadays thinks either can develop further on its own. It makes sense
to write “When I was a just-conceived fetus . . .” as does Ronald Dworkin
(1993, 18), but it would be unintelligible to say “When I was a sperm cell”
(or “. . . an ovum,” or “. . . a sperm and an ovum”) because, before conception, the sperm and ovum are far more like a man and a woman before they
get to know each other than they are like a single organism, in that prior
to conception there is no active immanent design directing those particular
cells to form any one of us. They come together only through chance—cf.
supra note 5—or today perhaps through construction, e.g., through in vitro
matchmaking.
24. To use embryos as fodder for research may appear to developmentalists
actually more dehumanizing than to abort them. Many people have abortions because they think that they have a duty as parents to take care of their
nascent child if they let the child be born; they have the abortion because
they do not feel that they are up to doing that duty. Despite its seeming
violence, abortion can have a human and a familial aspect to it, in that it
may acknowledge a future parental relationship and parental duty. In such
a case, the aborted fetus dies at least with the dignity of having been for a
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25.
26.
27.

28.

little while on the way to being someone’s cared-for child, and its loss may
even be mourned by its parents, perhaps even as a dead child (especially in
later pregnancy, when even constructionists may consider a child essentially
complete) but at the least (in early pregnancy) as a precious work in progress,
as Professor Conley implied. The clash of the constructionist model with the
developmentalist model is, however, much greater with regard to embryo
research. Both models, as we have seen, may find something to regret about
abortion. But they split radically with regard to the killing of extra-uterine
embryos. In contrast to how they may feel about aborted fetuses, pure constructionists can care very little, logically, about embryos destroyed just after
they have been conceived or cloned in a test tube. Never having been works
in progress, such embryos seem to lack any relationship to a future human
form, or to their parents, and so can be used and used up in experiments.
Yet from the very beginning, for a developmentalist, the identity and dignity
of a human being remain constant. The value of that jaguar photo changes
hardly at all from the instant that it is snapped to the moment when it is fully
developed. Thus, from a developmentalist viewpoint, embryonic stem cell
research is not less but more dehumanizing than abortion. Embryos subject
to research are first commodified and then destroyed for body parts. Few if
any mourn their deaths. So it is that their human dignity can appear more
radically negated by embryonic stem cell research than by abortion.
See text accompanying notes 6–8, supra.
See the fine summary of modern debates among Thomists found in Haldane
and Lee 2003, pp. 255–78.
This observation is founded on fact and logic, not on authority. But it is also
an ordinary teaching of modern science in contexts not involving a defense
of embryo destruction. See, e.g., Moore and Persaud 1998, p. 2: “Human
development is a continuous process that begins when an ovum from a
female is fertilized by a sperm from a male. A zygote is the beginning of a
new human being. . . .” and Larsen 1998, p. 14: “This moment of zygote
formation may be taken as the beginning or zero point time of embryonic
development.” Maureen Condic’s excellent paper explores in much greater
detail the precise moment in zygote formation at which a new individual life
has begun, focusing especially on disputes among scientists concerning the
significance of syngamy (2008, 8–9).
“The body of a human being, from the very first stages of its existence, can
never be reduced merely to a group of cells. The embryonic human body
develops progressively according to a well-defined program with its proper
finality . . .” (Dignitas personae § 4). This continuity “does not allow us to
posit either a change in nature or a gradation in moral value.” Id., § 5.
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29. Cf. Talbott 2010, p. 3.
30. The construction of an “autogen,” of a self-generating and self-organizing
system, a goal of applied cybernetics, may also help us understand better the
evolutionary emergence of “purposive organic life and cognitive processes.”
See the somewhat misleadingly-titled essay by Colin McGinn, “Can Anything
Emerge from Nothing?” (McGinn 2012) (review of Deacon 2012).
31. Immanuel Kant also relies on humanity as an inner essence or nature, present long before it is fully manifested, to indicate who has human dignity and
autonomy rights. A small child is “a being endowed with freedom” long
before it can act freely:
[T]here follows from procreation in [the marital] community a duty
to preserve and care for its offspring. . . . For the offspring is a person,
and it is impossible to form a concept of the production of a being
endowed with freedom through a physical operation. . . . They cannot
destroy their child as if he were something they had made (since a being
endowed with freedom cannot be a product of this kind) or as if he
were their property, nor can they even just abandon him to chance,
since they have brought not merely a worldly being but a citizen of the
world into a condition which cannot now be indifferent to them even
just according to concepts of right. (1996, 64; emphasis in original)
32. Rakowski makes a similar point in criticizing Dworkin (1993), arguing as
follows:
A newborn’s cognitive abilities are little different from those of many
nonhuman animals. Yet many people think an infant deserves the
same protection as older people because of what it could become. . . .
But what about killing a fetus? A fetus’ potential is the same as an
infant’s. . . . This fact motivates most moral distress over abortion. . . .
(1994, 2078)
33. Recall that, in an early section of this essay, we saw many contemporary
references to the embryo as something constructed, accumulated, made, or
still unformed—even though no outside creator to do the construction or
the making or the accumulating or the forming is easily available in modern
biology. See supra notes 3 and 4 and accompanying text.
34. Shields also points out that abortion providers themselves are more distressed
by abortions after the first trimester, when fetuses develop human-appearing
characteristics, and often refuse to do such abortions (2011, 504–05).

[ 379 ]

kennedy institute of ethics journal • december 2014

35. Carefully considered, Shields’ data do not quite support his conclusion that
these militants feel early abortion to be less immoral. Their greater hostility to late-term abortionists could be due to the militants feeling that those
abortionists have no excuse for ignoring the humanity of the unborn, whereas
during early pregnancy abortionists, under the influence of constructionism,
may not fully realize what they are doing.
36. This is the reverse side of the difficulty constructionists have in applying their
model to fetal development beyond at most three months, as noted in the
text accompanying note 9, supra. Just as it is hard to apply the construction
model to the growth and maturation of an already present form, so it is hard
to apply the development model to metamorphosis, to transformation, to
apparently substantial changes in outward form. This may be one reason
Aristotle delayed fetal ensoulment until a point in early pregnancy before
which there had been a gradual construction of human form, by the paternal
soul working through the semen.
37. Kwame Anthony Appiah takes a giant step toward imagining an individualized, and thus humanized, future for the unborn when he writes that Americans debating abortion might consider that “those dead fetuses could have
been . . . their children’s friends” (2006, 82). The capacity to be a friend is
a universal trait of human beings and yet also a personalizing one. There
are many “Asian women with artistic talent,” but every friend is a unique
individual. To say that an embryo could be a friend is thus to envision it as
a human individual even though nothing individual is yet known about him
or her.
38. Emmanuel Levinas suggests that it is precisely the face of the Other that
calls us to obligation (Levinas 1969). Real-time ultrasound images of fetal
faces may indeed already be affecting our attitudes to prenatal life. However,
perhaps no computer-generated image of a face could present the Other in
the way an actual face can do.
39. United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Secretariat for Pro-Life Activities, http://old.usccb.org/prolife/JoshuaFINAL.pdf (last visited Sept. 4, 2012).
40. LifeSiteNews (Nov. 15, 2010) http://www.lifesitenews.com/news/youmewere-all-just-grown-up-embryos-billboard-campaign-counters-embryores (capitalization in original). Opponents of abortion, like those opposed
to the destruction of embryos, have attempted similarly to use hindsight to
show the dynamic quality of intrauterine potential and its ability to provide
a unified identity across the span of human development. During the week
of President Obama’s first inauguration, as described by LifeSiteNews, there
appeared a brief video that was viewed by hundreds of thousands of persons.
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The ad shows an ultrasound of a baby in a womb, while the text
explains that during his life the baby’s father will abandon him,
and his single mother will struggle to support him. But “despite the
hardships he will endure,” the ad continues, “this child will become
the 1st African American President.” The ad climaxes with a picture
of President Obama and the slogan, “Life. Imagine the Potential.”
LifeSiteNews, (Jan. 25, 2009), http://www.lifesitenews.com/news/pro-lifeobama-ad-viewed-over-250000-times-in-three-days.
41. Shields’ paper was the lead article in a symposium on “Politics, Sentiments,
and Stem Cells.”
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